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THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL SYNTHESIS
JENNIFER M. COOPER†
INTRODUCTION
This Article applies scientific research to improve and
systematize legal synthesis, a vital element of reasoning that
spans legal analysis, legal education, and law practice. Despite its
critical role in legal analysis, synthesis is poorly understood, hard
to perform, and even harder to describe.1 Synthesis embodies a
hidden curriculum that legal educators expect students to learn
“by osmosis.”2 This lack of transparency frustrates both professor
and student, rendering the skill difficult to teach, assess, and
master.
This Article provides reliable methodologies to better
understand how legal synthesis really works and how to actually
perform it. Part I provides a high-level overview of the centrality
of synthesis and inductive reasoning in legal analysis and a review
of legal texts examining how legal synthesis is described and
taught. Part II examines the science of synthesis, the role of
categorization in inductive reasoning, and the research findings
leading to greater inductive strength. Finally, Part III explains
the mechanics of synthesis and proposes concrete, evidence-based
recommendations for effective legal synthesis.

†
Associate Professor of the Practice of Law, University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. Special thanks to Richard Neumann, Nancy Leong, Mary Bowman, and Linda
Edwards for extensive feedback. The author is grateful to the members of the Rocky
Mountain Legal Writing Scholarship Group who read through several drafts and
offered thoughtful critique as well as scholarship support from the Legal Writing
Institute & We Write Retreat.
1
Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real Cases, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245,
246 (2011) (explaining that law students have a difficult time grasping rule synthesis).
See also Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case
Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“[N]ot all lawyers are able to synthesize
well enough for sophisticated law practice. Some lawyers understand and use this
skill intuitively but do not consciously think about the steps they actually take.”).
2
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING xi (2009) (“In the typical law school, especially in the United
States, the faculty believes that it teaches legal thinking and reasoning by osmosis, or
interstitially, in the process of providing instruction in substantive subjects such as
torts, contracts, criminal law, property, civil procedure, and constitutional law.”).
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Synthesis is critical to “thinking like a lawyer,” but is as much
art as logic.3 Karl Llewellyn described “thinking like a lawyer” as
“that out of the matching of a number of related cases it is your job
to formulate a rule that covers them all in harmony, if that can be
done . . . .”4 Llewellyn was effectively describing “synthesis,” a
process of abstracting patterns and inducing generalizing
principles from groups of legal authorities to create a unified idea
representing and harmonizing the individual sources.
Legal education relies on teaching and learning through the
data analysis of individual judicial opinions as worked examples.5
Synthesis underlies the common law and all legal education, from
contracts and torts to legal writing.6 Yet law students and lawyers
struggle to move beyond superficial, explicit text in judicial
opinions to recognize patterns and structural relationships, to
abstract, and to synthesize information into comprehensive
generalized rules.7 This Article embraces Frederick Schauer’s call
to better understand legal reasoning through cognitive science–
the study of how people think.8 While legal scholarship and texts
3
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 964 (1996). Brewer
explains there is an art, as well as logic to analogy and art to logical proof. See id. The
same inductive reasoning process used in developing analogies applies to the
induction required for synthesis.
4
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 52–53
(1951).
5
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE
A LAWYER” 26 (2007) (discussing the use of the Socratic method in legal education);
Laurel Currie Oates, Did Harvard Get It Right?, 59 MERCER L. REV. 675, 705 (2008)
(“[L]aw students engage in analysis when they brief a case, identifying the key facts,
the issue, the court’s holding, and the court’s reasoning, and they engage in synthesis
when they prepare outlines.”).
6
See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 9–12, 91 (3d ed. 1997). Aldisert explains that the abstraction of generalized
rules from individual case examples is critical to common law legal analysis because
it is highly unlikely that the same exact factual and legal issue will be replicated. See
also SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 18–19. Schauer argues that reasoning with rules is a
genuinely important part of law and legal reasoning and that it is often difficult for
law students, lawyers, and judges to appreciate rules. Id.
7
After spending many hours reading objective memos written by first-year, firstsemester law students, I was frustrated by students’ robotic parroting of explicit
language from judicial opinions without nuance or depth and strings of case holdings
passed off as “synthesis.” Nor am I alone. Legal scholars have similarly observed law
students’ and lawyers’ difficulty in synthesizing multiple cases and use of strings of
cases as “synthesis.” See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in “Legal Analysis”: A
Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 443 (1986) (“When asked to formulate
a legal argument based, for example, on four or five related cases, most students will
simply talk about the cases one after another.”).
8
See SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 99.
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explain processes for legal synthesis, these texts lack scientific
theory or evidence-based methodologies for performing synthesis
and evaluating whether it is effective.9 To that end, this Article
examines the science of legal synthesis from multiple, individual
case examples,10—a process necessary for all legal analysis and
writing11—and concludes with concrete, evidence-based
recommendations for legal synthesis.
I. SYNTHESIS AND INDUCTIVE REASONING IN LEGAL ANALYSIS
“Reasoning is the central activity in intelligent thinking.”12

Law is an intellectual discipline, considered by many to be a
science13 discernable through analysis of the raw data of cases,
where the scientific tools of intellect are reasoning and
argument.14 “Logic[al reasoning] is the lifeblood of American
law.”15 Thinking like a lawyer: the law’s intellectual brand.16

9
Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing theory underlying synthesis,
suggesting a charting and synthesis methodology, but omitting discussion about
cognitive processes underlying synthesis).
10
See generally RUTH ANN MCKINNEY, READING LIKE A LAWYER: TIME-SAVING
STRATEGIES FOR READING LAW LIKE AN EXPERT (2d ed. 2014); Jane Bloom Grisé,
Critical Reading Instruction: The Road to Successful Legal Writing Skills, 18 W. MICH.
U. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 259, 269 (2017) (stating that legal analytical skills
such as “case analysis, statute analysis, synthesis, and application [are] not possible
unless students [can] critically read” legal materials).
11
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501,
506 (1948) (describing synthesis as “the creation of a legal concept . . . as cases are
compared”). See Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education:
Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 21 (1951); Wangerin, supra note 7, at
445 (“Traditional law school casebooks provide excellent resources for practicing the
skill of using synthesis.”). While it may discuss, in passing, other forms of logical
reasoning used in legal reasoning, this article’s focus is on induction and its role in
synthesis.
12
Jonathan St.B. T. Evans, The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning: An
Introduction, 46A Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 561, 561 (1993).
13
See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 5, at 1.
14
This article focuses on reasoning, not argument. See Nelson P. Miller & Bradley
J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge to Make Legal Analysis Explicit–
Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 192, 199 (2009) (“Law
practice is intellectual.”). See also Brewer, supra note 3, at 926.
15
Ruggero J. Aldisert, Stephen Clowney & Jeremy D. Peterson, Logic for Law
Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (footnote
omitted).
16
See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.
S.F. L. REV. 121, 122 (1994); Wangerin, supra note 7, at 429–31 (“ ‘[T]hinking like a
lawyer’ means mastering six distinct and specifically definable skills . . . [that] revolve
around the use of facts, statutes, synthesis, analogies, policy, and apparent
contradiction.”).
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Legal literature primarily studies three types of reasoning—
deductive, inductive, and analogic17—and focuses primarily on
deductive18 and analogic reasoning,19 largely ignoring inductive
and other types of non-logic-based reasoning.20 Most legal scholars
agree that analogic reasoning is inductive in nature, despite
disagreement and confusion about the relationship between
analogy and induction.21
The syllogism is the best-known paradigm of deductive
reasoning: state a major premise, then a minor premise, and draw
a conclusion from the premises.22 The major premise must be a
true statement, the minor premise must be a true statement; the
conclusion, therefore, is proved to be true.23 A valid syllogism
transfers the truth of the premises to the conclusion. Deductive
reasoning allows one to reason from broad to specific, from major
premises to draw narrow conclusions.24 A well-known syllogistic
example states: All men are mortal (major premise). Socrates is a
man (minor premise). Therefore, Socrates is mortal (conclusion).

17
Brewer, supra note 3, at 926. The reasoning methods that “do the Law’s work”
are induction, deduction, abduction, and analogic reasoning. Id. Brewer’s article
draws on work in jurisprudence, language, philosophy, logic, and epistemology. See
also Evans, supra note 12, at 561–62.
18
Brewer, supra note 3, at 943; Evans, supra note 12, at 562.
19
Legal reasoning is most closely associated with reasoning by analogy. Dan
Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law, 48 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 365, 365 (1998) (“[M]ost works on legal reasoning focus on deductive or
analogical inference.”). Analogical reasoning requires the comparison of precedent
with a new legal situation, in a direct case-by-case comparison of facts to predict an
outcome. Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally (or
Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 454, 456 (2008) (“The
legal system, like reasoning generally, frequently uses analogies with previous
decisions to inform or assist current decisions. But the legal system, like decision
making generally, often also uses a method of decision making in which the decision
makers are expected not just to use past decisions to help them make better ones now,
but to follow past decisions even when the decision makers believe those decisions are
mistaken.”).
20
Hunter, supra note 19, at 367. Types of reasoning include rule-based,
analogical, policy-based, principle-based, custom-based, inferential, narrative, etc. See
LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 53–60 (5th ed. 2019).
21
Hunter, supra note 19, at 393 (noting that Golding and Posner argue that
induction and analogy are the same but differ on which reasoning dominates and
which is subservient).
22
Id. at 365; Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 2–4 (“Deductive
reasoning, as Aristotle taught long ago, is based on the act of proving a conclusion by
means of two other propositions.”). Aldisert and his co-authors estimate that 90
percent of legal issues are resolved by deduction. Id. at 2.
23
Id. at 4.
24
Id. at 10.

2021]

THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL SYNTHESIS

289

Deductive reasoning can be expressed syllogistically even
when parts of the syllogism are not expressed. When the “premise
or conclusion is obvious,” it may be omitted, leading to an
enthymeme.25 Deductive reasoning is useful in legal analysis
when reasoning from a known rule—a statute or clearly defined
common law rule or policy.26
Inductive reasoning, the mirror opposite of deductive
reasoning, allows one to use specific observations to draw broad
generalizations in creating a rule.27 Unlike deductive reasoning,
which requires a broad rule to initiate reasoning, inductive
reasoning allows one to reason in the absence of a well-defined
rule, from specific to broad: abstracting individual examples into
broader categories based on unifying principles and similarities,
observing patterns in the individual data, inducing
generalizations, and inferring a broad explanation or rule.28
“[I]nduction is central to human reasoning” and a critical
higher-level cognitive function of the human mind, requiring a
more complex cognitive process than deduction.29
Unlike
deductive reasoning, which leads to irrefutable conclusions,
inductive reasoning is inherently uncertain and probabilistic, only
logically sound to the extent which, given the premises, the
inferred conclusion is credible according to the evidence.30
25

Id. at 8.
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 43 (3d
ed. 2007).
27
Hunter, supra note 19, at 369 (“Induction is, generally, the process of taking a
number of specific cases or instances, classifying them into categories according to
relevant attributes and outcomes, and deriving a broadly applicable rule from them.”).
28
We take isolated experiences and explain them with a general rule that covers
the instances. This is often referred to as inductive generalization, which is the
formation of a general rule from patterns in data. See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too
Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1207–08 (2001).
29
Hunter, supra note 19, at 365, 367. The study of induction has a long history
rooted in philosophy with the “best-known analysis” in Hume’s critique of inductive
reasoning as weaker than deductive reasoning, arguing there is little to “no basis for
establishing the validity of a method for drawing inductive inferences.” Evan Heit,
Properties of Inductive Reasoning, 7 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 569, 570 (2000).
“[P]sychological research . . . paint[s] a somewhat more optimistic picture,” finding
that inductive reasoning is not only “widespread in human thought,” but that humans
naturally and organically “perform [inductive] reasoning very systematically.” Id. See
also A TAXONOMY FOR LEARNING, TEACHING, AND ASSESSING: A REVISION OF BLOOM’S
TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES 294 (Lorin W. Anderson et al. eds., complete
ed. 2001) (“Deduction involves breaking a whole into subparts, evaluating them, and
determining whether criteria are met. Induction, on the other hand, involves finding
things that could fit together, judging their appropriateness, and assembling them to
best meet criteria.”).
30
Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 13.
26
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Whereas syllogistic, deductive reasoning is formulaic and exact,
inductive reasoning cannot be absolute because the conclusions
are probabilistic, but they cannot be “guaranteed to be correct.”31
Nevertheless, legal reasoning relies on probabilistic, inductive
reasoning methodologies such as categorization, similarity
judgments, and probability judgments.32 Legal scholars describe
induction as “a centerpiece of scientific reasoning [that] looms
large in the generalizations on which lawyers and judges rely in
legal argument.”33 Inductive generalization is the scientific term
describing the generalization of rules from particular cases, where
a rule or type of argument features premises based on specific
examples and the conclusion “states a probabilistic generalization”
inferred from the specific examples.34
Inductive generalization, the scientific term for synthesis, is
necessary in the absence of clear rules to create or generate a rule
from multiple individual cases or recognize patterns in the law.
Such a synthesized rule is induced from a line of cases and
becomes a major premise from which a conclusion may be deduced
in future cases.35
Analogies are “familiar” and “ubiquitous” in legal reasoning.36
Analogic reasoning is less concerned with rule generation and
more concerned with comparative reasoning in legal analysis,
allowing one to reason from specific to specific—to compare and
contrast individual features of examples to predict a result based
on similarities and differences.37 In law, we reason that because a
current situation is similar to a past situation, the current
situation should result in the same outcome.38 Some critics
suggest analogic analysis is the “least well understood and
explicated form of reasoning”39 and that analogic analysis relies on
“surface” similarities without considering policy or underlying
purposes of the law.40 Despite this criticism, analogic reasoning
remains central to legal thought.
31

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Hunter, supra note 28, at 1207–08.
33
Brewer, supra note 3, at 945.
34
Id. at 944; ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 91.
35
ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 10.
36
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 85; Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1993).
37
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 85–86.
38
Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 17.
39
Brewer, supra note 3, at 926.
40
Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765 (2006)
(book review).
32

2021]

THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL SYNTHESIS

291

Inductive generalization—that is, synthesis—is often
confused with reasoning by analogy. While both follow an
inductive process, “induction requires the generalization of a rule,”
whereas analogy attempts to predict an outcome based on
individual similarities, or lack thereof, rather than generalizing or
synthesizing overarching principles.41 While deduction leads to
certainty, induction and analogy lead to probability, yet are still
uncertain.42 Inductive reasoning identifies relationships and,
based on those relationships, predicts probabilities instead of
guarantees.43
This Article focuses on inductive analysis, rather than
analogic analysis. As such, the information in the following table
provides a very brief overview and distinction among reasoning
types.
Descriptions of Reasoning44
Type
Process
Conclusion
Deductive
General
Rule

Specific Certainty,
Examples
conclusive
Top  Down
Inductive
Specific Examples  General Probability,
Rule
predictive
Bottom  Up
Analogic
Specific Examples  Specific Probability,
Examples Side  Side
predictive
The legal system’s normative order, informed by the rule of
law, “aspires to be rational in significant ways.”45 This Article
focuses on the inductive process of generalizing rules of law from
multiple, complex sources of information that are logical and
rationally sound. This is the process of synthesis in legal analysis.
Synthesis is necessary in legal analysis to formulate rules of
law, especially when rules are not explicitly stated. Legal analysis
depends on the clear, precise articulation of a “rule . . . of law”
before application of law to facts to predict a result or craft a

41

Hunter, supra note 28, at 1207–08.
Id. at 1209.
43
See id. at 1208; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Questions and Challenges for the New
Psychology of Reasoning, 18 THINKING & REASONING 5, 13 (2012).
44
Evans, supra note 43, at 13.
45
Brewer, supra note 3, at 929.
42
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persuasive argument with rational force.46 The “common-law
method” aspires to “ ‘reach[ ] what instinctively seem[s] the right
result in a series of cases, and only later (if at all) enunciating the
principle that explains the patterns—a sort of connect-the-dots
exercise.’ . . . ‘Connecting the dots’ is but a shorthand way of
describing inductive reasoning.”47
The normative process of legal analysis is as follows: state the
applicable rule of law,48 explain how the rule evolved or is
applied,49 and apply the rule to the facts of a new case to support
a conclusion. When the rule is explicitly stated in a statute, an
enacted law, or a case rule, the deductive reasoning process is
relatively simple.50
More often, the rule is less explicit and left to the reader to
decipher. Frederick Schauer described the difficulty in legal
reasoning created by implicit rules:
The court states the rule of law on which it bases its decision,
applies the rule of law to the facts before it, and announces a
result. That is the holding. The problems come when a court
does not explicitly say what its holding is and leaves it up to
readers of the opinion to try to determine it.51

46

DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE
FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 21 (2d ed. 2009); see also DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN
ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 20 (1st ed. 1998)
[hereinafter ROMANTZ & VINSON, First Edition] (“The initial step in legal analysis is
to identify what rules apply to a particular legal issue.”).
47
ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 8–9 (footnote omitted).
48
See, e.g., HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 120–51
(7th ed. 2018); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 119 (2d
ed. 2011) (explaining that to prove a conclusion of law, you must state: the conclusion,
primary rule, rule explanation, rule application, restate conclusion); ROMANTZ &
VINSON, First Edition, supra note 46, at 19 (“Rules are important because they provide
the framework for legal analysis. . . . Rules include statutes, constitutions, treaties,
ordinances, and regulations. Rules are also derived from judicial decisions.”).
49
Sometimes stating an explicit rule from a statute as the applicable rule of law
is sufficient. However:
When the intent and the scope of the law are more complicated, however,
you may need to write a much longer explanation clarifying its meaning or
components. These explanations may require you either to[:] analyze the
language of a constitution or statute, set out the tests governing a law’s
application, or summarize a court’s discussion of that rule or a pertinent
discussion in a secondary authority, which has, perhaps, been adopted in
that jurisdiction.
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 48, at 124.
50
Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 2 (“Perhaps 90 percent of legal
issues can be resolved by deduction . . . .”); see also Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 10–12.
Statutes are explicit statements of a rule.
51
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 55.
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When the controlling rule is not explicitly stated, but instead
implied by the court’s selection of facts, reasoning, and holding,
the reader must read between the lines to extract and articulate
the invisible rule from the case.52
What the court decided is typically apparent from the
disposition—the appellate court affirms, denies, remands, and so
on. But the why is often invisible and quite difficult to discern.
When the court fails to explain why the facts are material to the
outcome, the facts become subject to multiple interpretations on
multiple levels of abstraction and create difficulties in identifying
the level of abstraction or level of generality that expose why the
court decided the what the way that it did.53 This Article is
concerned with this science of synthesis—extracting patterns and
structural similarities—to derive rules of law when the reasoning
is implied.
Schauer uses a well-known example of legal synthesis from
Justice Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company
to illustrate abstraction of structural similarities and resulting
synthesis in deriving a rule of law covering liability for inherently
dangerous products.54 In MacPherson, the plaintiff, Donald
MacPherson, purchased a Buick automobile from a car dealer, who
had purchased the vehicle from the manufacturer, the Buick
Motor Company.55 One of the car’s wooden wheels was defective
and failed, collapsing the car and injuring the plaintiff.56 The
Buick Motor Company had purchased the defective wheel from

52

CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL
ANALYSIS 102–04 (3d ed. 2018) (“As you research the law, you will look for [governing]
rules—both broad and narrow . . . . The rules will likely come from two places:
statutes and case law. Sometimes a statute or case law will clearly state the rules that
govern the element or factor you are analyzing. Those rules are called explicit rules.
Other times, however, finding the relevant rules requires you to sift through case law
and synthesize a rule. Those rules are called implicit rules.”). Coughlin explains that
there are three typical circumstances in which an attorney might derive an implicit
rule—that is, synthesize a rule from a series of authorities—(1) “[f]inding an implicit
rule from consistent decisions”; (2) “[f]inding consistency in seemingly inconsistent
cases”; and (3) “[b]ringing parts together to form a whole.” Id. at 104–07. Gionfriddo
explains the process of synthesis when ideas are implicit in a group of cases. See
Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 13–16 (stating that one must read between the lines to
extract or articulate an implied or invisible rule to begin the inductive generalization
required to synthesize a rule); see also SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 55.
53
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 50–53.
54
Id.; 217 N.Y. 382, 394 (1916).
55
MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 384.
56
Id. at 384–85.
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another manufacturer and was unaware of the defect.57 Judge
Cardozo reasoned that Buick Motor Company could have
discovered the defects in the wheel by reasonable inspection.58
Despite little natural similarity between Buicks, poisons, and
exploding coffee urns, Cardozo synthesized a rule based on
structural similarities, or relevant similarity, shared by these
inherently dangerous products. In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo
begins his synthesis by reviewing not cases involving other faulty
vehicles, but cases involving other “dangerous” products, such as
mislabeled poison,59 a manufacturer’s defect in a balance wheel for
a circular saw,60 improperly constructed scaffolding which
collapsed and injured a painter,61 and an exploding commercial
coffee urn.62
Cardozo abstracted the category to “poisons,
explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their
normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of
a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.”63
Law students and lawyers64 struggle to extract and synthesize
rules from individual cases with implicit holdings and disparate
facts, to formulate rules that “cover[ ] them all in harmony,” as
Professor Llewellyn suggested.65 Synthesis falls into the hidden
curriculum of law schools, one that professors expect students to
either know inherently or figure out on their own “by osmosis.”66
57

Id.
Id. at 385, 394.
59
Id. at 385.
60
Id. at 386.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 386–87.
63
Id. at 389.
64
Wangerin, supra note 7, at 443 (“For some reason, the creation of synthesis
seems to be surprisingly difficult for most students, and, for that matter, for most
lawyers.”); Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that not all lawyers synthesize
effectively for “sophisticated law practice,” either for lack of skill in executing the steps
or for lack of understanding of the value or methodology).
65
LLEWELLYN, supra note 4, at 52.
66
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at xi (“In the typical law school, especially in the United
States, the faculty believes that it teaches legal thinking and reasoning by osmosis, or
interstitially, in the process of providing instruction in substantive subjects such as
torts, contracts, criminal law, property, civil procedure, and constitutional law.”). The
“[h]idden [c]urriculum” was a concept first utilized by sociologist Philip Jackson to
describe messages, information, or skills students gain through the experience of
school not explicitly or formally taught. David M. Moss, The Hidden Curriculum of
Legal Education: Toward a Holistic Model for Reform, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 22; see
also Lara Freed & Joel Atlas, A Structural Approach to Case Synthesis, Fact
Application, and Persuasive Framing of the Law, 26 PERSPECTIVES 50, 50 (2018).
58
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Law students may be introduced to synthesis in a legal writing
class, yet fail to transfer the skill to other domains, such as torts
or contracts,67 or to appreciate the need to outline, abstract, and
synthesize structure of the law, instead focusing on the details of
each individual case example.
Law school casebooks are filled with “hard” cases at the
margins of the law.68 When “an issue of law is unsettled” and no
clear precedent or rule provides a major premise, then syllogistic,
deductive reasoning is no help at all, and inductive reasoning and
synthesis is one’s only hope.69 Synthesis is critical to the legal
analysis necessary for thinking like a lawyer. In light of its
importance and inherent complexity, one would presume that the
process itself is painstakingly examined and broken down for
novice legal writers. Yes and no.
Most legal texts explicitly discuss synthesis in some form.70
Many legal scholars and texts discuss the use of case charts as a
tool to collect information from individual cases—issues, facts,
reasoning, and holding—and observe patterns for synthesis.71
Although most legal texts describe the need for synthesis, very few
identify the science of synthesis in any meaningful depth. One of
the most comprehensive discussions of synthesis describes the
process as identifying similarities and abstracting common
meaning from them, creating a rule that is logical and reasonable:
Synthesis is the binding together of several opinions into a whole
that stands for a rule or an expression of policy. By focusing on
the reasoning and generalized facts that the cases have in
common, synthesis finds and explains collective meaning that is
not apparent from any individual case read in isolation from the
others. A synthesis is plausible if it’s logical, reasonable, and

67
Oates, supra note 5, at 690–91, 717. The Langdell/Harvard case method of legal
education helps law students engage in activities to analyze cases and problem-solve,
but relying solely on the casebook method without other active learning activities or
explicit instruction does not give law students an opportunity to use information in
“environments [where] students [will] be using what they learned.” Id. at 717.
68
Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 12.
69
Id.
70
This is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of every legal writing text, but
rather representative samples from legal writing texts used in law schools in firstyear legal research and writing courses, and how these texts teach, discuss, and
explain the purpose and process of synthesis.
71
See Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 16; see also LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., THE
LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 81–83 (7th ed.
2018); Tracy McGaugh, The Synthesis Chart: Swiss Army Knife of Legal Writing, 9
PERSPECTIVES 80, 80 (2001).
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consistent with public policy. A synthesis is more than a
description of several cases, one after another.72

Other legal texts describe synthesis as “combin[ing] the
language in the cases into one rule of law.”73 Describing synthesis
as “combin[ing]” information74 oversimplifies and underestimates
the complex cognitive processes required to abstract, categorize,
and generate rules, policy, or principles representing multiple
legal authorities.
Legal texts generally describe the process of rule synthesis as
follows:
(1) Read one case at a time,75
(2) Group cases according to holding/outcome,76
(3) Extract individual rules from each case, whether explicit
or implicit,77
(4) Synthesize a general principle of law from the individual
case rules,78

72
NEUMANN & SIMON, supra note 48, at 57. An accurate description of synthesis
without using “cognitive process” language describes the purpose for synthesis and
explains why synthesis matters in this discipline.
73
LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION
66 (7th ed. 2018); COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 104 (“Synthesizing means
combining principles stated in a series of authorities to form one rule.”); see generally
ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER (2d ed.
2020).
74
EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 66 (“You might be able to combine the language in
the cases into one rule of law. This process is called ‘synthesizing’ or ‘harmonizing’
opinions.”).
75
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 48, at 69 (“Synthesizing is the step between your
research and your writing. You do research by reading one case at a time.”).
76
Id. at 69–70. You will engage in one type of case synthesis when you group cases
according to the rule they follow.
77
NEUMANN & SIMON, supra note 48, at 35 (“When a court does not state a rule
of the case, you might be able to formulate the rule by converting the determinative
facts into elements of a rule.”).
78
The Neumann text explains the synthesis process as identification and
extraction of commonalities:
To turn a description of several cases into a unified synthesis, step back and
ask yourself what the cases really have in common under the surface.
Identify the threads that appear in [multiple] cases . . . , tie the threads
together, and organize the analysis around the threads themselves—rather
than around the individual cases.
Id. at 57. Neumann goes on to explain:
When in your mind you develop or discover a synthesis, you’ll usually do it
from the bottom up: You’ll work with the details of the cases (the bottom)
until you see the threads that produce the synthesis (the top). But when you
explain it in writing to your reader, you’ll do the reverse. You’ll start at the
top by stating the synthesis and work your way down by explaining how the
details support it.
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(5) Test your synthesized rule.79
This Article next explores cognitive science to better
understand and perform steps 4 and 5—the process of performing
and evaluating synthesis.
II. THE SCIENCE OF SYNTHESIS
Synthesis is a complex higher-order cognitive process,
described in Bloom’s Taxonomy as requiring the abstraction of
patterns or structures from individual elements to represent a
well-integrated whole:
[T]he putting together of elements and parts so as to form a
whole. [Synthesis] is a process of working with elements, parts,
etc., and combining them in such a way as to constitute a pattern
or structure not clearly there before. Generally this would
involve a recombination of parts of previous experience with new
material, reconstructed into a new and more or less wellintegrated whole.80

When synthesizing, one abstracts elements from many
disparate sources, discovering structures or patterns not clearly
visible before; this process yields a product that is more than the
source materials yet represents the whole.81 When Bloom’s
Taxonomy was revised, synthesis was renamed and incorporated
into the higher-order thinking “Create” category—described as
“putting elements together to form a coherent or functional whole,”
remaining at the highest order of thinking and cognitive
processes.82
Synthesis is a complex cognitive process using inductive
reasoning.83 The inductive cognitive processes of synthesis have
Id. at 57–58.
79
The Neumann text describes a necessary step to test the synthesized rule for
realism: “The last skill is testing the result of your reasoning to see whether it would
seem realistic to the judicial mind.” Id. at 58. That test, however, is not really
articulated, other than saying it requires experience to understand, or asking whether
the reasoning “would be inconsistent with a judge’s trained intuition.” Id. at 58–59.
80
BENJAMIN S. BLOOM ET AL., TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: THE
CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS 162 (1956). Bloom’s Original Taxonomy
consisted of six major categories arranged from lower order to higher order thinking:
Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation.
81
Id.
82
A TAXONOMY FOR LEARNING, TEACHING, AND ASSESSING: A REVISION OF
BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES 84 (Lorin W. Anderson et al. eds.,
abr. ed. 2001).
83
Hunter, supra note 19, at 369 (“Induction is, generally, the process of taking a
number of specific cases or instances, classifying them into categories according to
relevant attributes and outcomes, and deriving a broadly applicable rule from them.”).
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been studied extensively by cognitive scientists, philosophers, and
logicians,84 defining synthesis as inductive generalization.85
People do not only rely on inductive reasoning to make inferences,
predictions, and generalizations; they also perform inductive
reasoning
systematically. Cognitive
science
is
the
interdisciplinary, scientific study of the human mind and its
processes—how the mind works, how we think and reason—and
provides concrete, evidence-based guidance for abstracting
general principles from groups of individual case examples.86
The next Section will analyze the processes required for
synthesis. This discussion will briefly discuss categorization, a
primary step in induction. The discussion of categorization is not
intended to be exhaustive, but to provide a basic overview of the
role of categorization in induction. This overview provides the
foundation for the subsequent discussion of abstraction and
induction of generalized rules from category members, which will
be discussed in more detail below.
A.

Categorization in Induction and Synthesis
“If learned knowledge consisted merely of isolated facts with
no generalization, then the knowledge would be useless
except for the unlikely exact recurrence of the learned
situation.”87

People categorize everything: trees, animals, cars, exploding
coffee urns, poisons, written language, and behavior.88
Categorization is second nature in human conscious and
unconscious thought and is the building block of the human

84
Brewer, supra note 3, at 926. Brewer identifies this “greater methodological
reciprocity between legal reasoning and other intellectual disciplines.” Id. Methods
associated with legal reason are also studied in natural and demonstrative sciences,
such as math, logic, social science, and all play a vital role in legal reasoning. Id.
85
Hunter, supra note 19, at 365. Hunter defines inductive generalization as the
generalization of a rule from multiple individual cases. Id. at 365, 380.
86
See Hillary Burgess, Deepening the Discourse Using the Legal Mind’s Eye:
Lessons from Neuroscience and Psychology that Optimize Law School Learning, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
87
John K. Kruschke, Category Learning, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION 183, 183
(Koen Lamberts & Robert Goldstone eds., 2005).
88
Id. Cars are more like other cars, even differing models such as Toyotas and
Ferraris, than cars are like trees. James A. Hampton, The Role of Similarity in
Natural Categorization, in SIMILARITY AND CATEGORIZATION 13, 13 (Ulrike Hahn &
Michael Ramscar eds., 2001).
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cognitive process.89 This conscious and unconscious informationsorting into discrete groups forms the building blocks of induction
and synthesis; the process relies on inferences of unseen attributes
from observable features, generalization, and classification of
attributes into categories.90
The instinct to categorize and group objects, events, and
information into discrete categories based on similarities, and to
induce general principles based on properties of category
members, is a frequent area of study in cognitive science.91 Legal
scholars have also recognized the critical role of categorization in
law, legal theory, legal analysis, inductive reasoning, and
analogy.92 Information hierarchies and taxonomies rely on
categorization to organize and abstract properties from individual
objects to superordinate categories.93 For example, scientists
categorize information into taxonomies from the highest levels of
domain and kingdom, down to subordinate levels of genus, species,
and subspecies.94
Categorization is highly contextual and domain specific and
requires induction of unifying similarities, outcomes, or properties
to generalize a category from individual examples.95 In the 1970s,
researcher Eleanor Rosch developed the prototype theory of
categorization.96 Rosch’s research rejected two commonly held
89

Hampton, supra note 88. The idea that humans intuitively categorize
everything “because we find them similar” seems “non-controversial, if not circular.”
Id. Humans “form categories of many different kinds in the course of everyday
cognition.” Id.
90
Kruschke, supra note 87. Because inference of appropriate action is perhaps
the fundamental goal of cognition, categorization and category learning are core
research domains in cognitive science.
91
Charles Kemp & Alan Jern, A Taxonomy of Inductive Problems, 21
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 23, 29 (2014).
92
See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
223–58 (2001); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453–54 (1930); Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58
MERCER L. REV. 845, 845 (2007); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased:
The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
1103, 1131 (2004); Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 372, 373 (1996).
93
Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27, 30 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). Rosch defines
taxonomy as “a system by which categories are related to one another by means of
class inclusion.” Id.
94
Id. The scientific categorization or taxonomic classification exemplifies
inductive reasoning by classifying organisms from the domain and kingdom down to
the genus and species level.
95
Id. at 41–43.
96
Id.
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beliefs: that all category members are good examples of a category,
and that categories are independent of outside influences.97 Some
items, which Rosch termed prototypes, are more representative of
a category than others.98 Birds like robins and blue jays are more
birdlike, and therefore, more prototypical birds than ostriches,
penguins, or emus.99
According to Rosch’s prototype theory, categorization is an
inexact process with fuzzy boundaries, rejecting the classical view
that categories have clear, well-defined boundaries set by natural
ideas of similarity and category membership.100 Rosch’s research
on categorization critically informs later discussions of synthesis.
Categorization allows us to use knowledge about categories
both to generate rules from category members and to understand
individual category members themselves. In addition,
“categorization occurs on different dimensions and at different
levels of abstraction simultaneously.”101 Categorization allows one
to “retain[ ] previously learned knowledge while quickly acquiring
new knowledge,”102 promoting cognitive economy—maximizing
information gain with the least cognitive effort and minimizing
cognitive load.103 Categorical induction is essential for efficient
learning and problem solving because individual examples fade
more quickly in memory than rules developed from category
members, proving we are more likely to remember a rule than the
individual examples used to develop the rule.104

97

Id.
Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 532, 544–45
(1975).
99
Chen & Hanson, supra note 92, at 1151 n.183.
100
See Rosch, supra note 98, at 544.
101
Kruschke, supra note 87, at 184 (“For example, a cardinal (i.e. the bird) can
evoke the color category red or the part category feather or the object category animal,
and so on. Within [each category] there are levels of abstraction, such as scarlet, red
or warm within the ‘color’ [category], or cardinal, bird or animal within the ‘object’
[category].”). The basic level of abstraction is that level of abstraction appropriate for
using, thinking about, or naming an object. Id.
102
Id. at 183.
103
See Jacob Feldman, The Simplicity Principle in Human Concept Learning, 12
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 227, 227 (2003). This cognitive economy is
related to working memory and cognitive load, also called complexity minimization in
other cognitive science literature. See id.
104
Douglas L. Medin & Lance J. Rips, Concepts and Categories: Memory,
Meaning, and Metaphysics, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND
REASONING 37, 45 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005).
98

2021]

THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL SYNTHESIS

301

Categorization serves critical cognitive functions in induction
and synthesis in matching, sorting, grouping, and abstracting.105
As will be discussed in more detail, similarity, typicality, and
diversity of examples play critical roles across categorization,
induction, and resulting synthesis.
B.

Inductive Strength of Categories
“[O]ne of the fascinating characteristics of human inductive
inference is that people do not simply add up evidence from
individual cases.”106

Developing and abstracting relationships from objects is
commonplace in human thought, but its regularity belies its
complexity. Abstract relational thinking is a “late evolutionary
development” in the frontal cortex, similar to higher order
thinking such as executive function.107 This Section discusses
concepts highly relevant to synthesis: how we abstract individual
objects to develop generalized rules and the inductive strength of
categories themselves.
Similarity and diversity are critical to induction and inductive
strength, a common theme that emerges across diverse disciplines
such as cognitive science, philosophy, logic, and legal reasoning.
Three research findings are critical to induction and synthesis.
First, similarity and typicality of individual examples promote
inference and categorization. Second, the number and diversity of
individual examples within a category predict the inductive
strength of synthesis within a category.108 Third, some properties

105
Hunter, supra note 19, at 396. Hunter describes inductive legal reasoning as
taking multiple individual cases, categorizing them according to similarity based
relevant attributes and outcomes, and deriving a general rule. See id. at 367–68.
Hunter also notes the importance of categorization in statutory interpretation,
ejusdem generis⎯“of the same genus”⎯which relies on inductive reasoning with the
identification of the genus as the first step in the interpretive process. See id. at 392.
This emphasis on categorization is described in legal scholarship and texts as sorting,
matching, categorizing, grouping, and so on. It is also explicitly applied in the process
of “case charting.”
106
Heit, supra note 29, at 576 (emphasis added).
107
Leonidas A. A. Doumas & John E. Hummel, Approaches to Modeling Human
Mental Representations: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 104, at 73.
108
While a large number of premises can be a reliable predictor of inductive
strength, variability or diversity is also critical to inductive strength. Heit, supra note
29, at 577. The idea that “more variable observations promote broader or stronger
generalizations, is now considered a truism in areas of research near to induction,
such as categorization.” Id. Heit’s Properties of Inductive Reasoning reviews the main
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shared by individual examples are more generalizable than others,
depending on relevant similarity. Each will be discussed in more
detail below.
1.

Similarity and Typicality

Similarity is the most predictive indicator of inductive
strength. The “observation that [an object] has a certain property
promote[s] the inference that something else [also] has that
property” when the objects share similar characteristics.109 The
similarity effect, the idea that commonalities in objects promote
the inference of additional commonalities in those objects, spans
multiple disciplines from philosophy to logic, legal theory, and
cognitive science. Similarity as inference promoting is logical and
relates back to the human instinct to categorize like with like.110
Three factors consistently promote strong inferences from
individual examples:111 similarity between individual premises;112
typicality of the premise to the conclusion category;113 and
homogeneity of the conclusion.114
Similarity is the most obvious and robust predictor of
inductive strength and is the rule, not the exception.115 We are
more willing to project a property known to be true of crocodiles to
alligators than from crocodiles to koala bears due to the pervasive
power of perceived similarity of crocodiles and alligators. In a
seminal study on inductive reasoning in 1975, researchers
discovered that the more similar the premise was to the
conclusion, the stronger the inference.116 Subjects were asked to
assume that all members of an animal species on a small, remote

psychological phenomena of inductive reasoning, covering twenty-five years of
experimental and model-based research. See generally id.
109
Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
110
Id. at 576.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 569. Similarities between the premise and conclusion promotes strong
inferences. Id. at 570.
113
Id. at 570. The more typical premise categories are of the conclusion category,
the stronger the argument. People are more willing to project from robins to birds
than from penguins to birds because robins are more typical of the category birds than
penguins. Medin & Rips, supra note 104, at 40.
114
Heit, supra note 29, at 570–71. Novel, idiosyncratic qualities are unlikely to be
widely projected to other examples. Id. at 589.
115
Ulrike Hahn & Michael Ramscar, Conclusion: Mere Similarity?, in SIMILARITY
AND CATEGORIZATION, supra note 88, at 257; Heit, supra note 29, at 571.
116
Heit, supra note 29, at 571.
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island had contracted a contagious disease.117 The subjects were
then told that all rabbits on the island contracted the disease.118
Subjects were asked to predict what proportion of dogs would also
have the disease.119 Subjects were more likely to infer from rabbits
to dogs than from rabbits to bears, due to greater perceived
similarity between rabbits and dogs than betweenrabbits and
bears.120
The more typical the premise items are of the conclusion
category, the stronger the inference and rational force121—the
more prototypical, the stronger the inference. This is consistent
with Rosch’s prototype theory. People are more willing to project
a property from robins to birds than from penguins to birds
because robins are prototypical birds and more typical of the bird
category than penguins are.122
The more homogenous the category members are, the stronger
the inference and rational force. People are less willing to project
seemingly idiosyncratic properties to entire categories, but more
willing to draw inferences from invariant properties to
homogenous conclusion categories.123
Researchers studied
subjects’ willingness to draw inferences to whole populations
based on varying premises and sample sizes of individuals in the
population.124 For example, subjects were told that one member of
a fictional island group, the Barratos, was obese and then were
asked to project that premise of obesity to the entire Barratos
population based on the obesity of only one member.125 Subjects
were unwilling to make strong inferences to the entire group based
on a perceived idiosyncratic, individualistic trait.126 But the more
homogenous and invariant the property, the more subjects were
willing to draw inferences to entire populations, even from a very
small sample size.127 In the example, the more members who were
obese, the more subjects were likely to infer the characteristics to
117

Id. Many early cognitive science studies focused on animals due to straightforward taxonomies, ordinate and superordinate structures, and hierarchies. Id. at
571–72.
118
Id. at 571.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 573.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 577.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 589.
127
Id. at 577.
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the entire population.128 Legal scholars recognize the similarity
effect as a key step in the legal reasoning process in induction and
abstracting general rules from individual cases.129
2.

Numerosity and Diversity

Numerosity and diversity promote strong inferences from
multiple cases. Greater numbers of diverse individual examples
create fertile ground for inductive generalization and lead to
stronger inductive generalization from a set of multiple
examples.130 Whereas similarity initially leads to categorization,
dissimilarity through numerosity and diversity of examples within
a particular category lead to stronger induction of rules and
reliability of induced rules.131
Similarity is the gateway to synthesis, but numerosity and
diversity are the glue. Though counterintuitive, both similarity
and dissimilarity play important roles in the science of synthesis.
When inducing information, we are typically faced with large
amounts of conflicting information. Rather than just one example,
there is often an extensive set of examples to rely on and
consider.132 Counterintuitively, combining two strong cases does
not necessarily lead to a stronger inductive outcome.133 A group of
weaker cases can make a stronger unified whole.134
Numerosity is the number of the sample size, and leads to
stronger inferences: the greater the number of examples, the
greater the inductive strength.135 Returning to the study about the
fictional Barratos island group, researchers studied inferences
about people and objects on a small island, yet systematically
varied the number of observations.136 Subjects were told that some
members of the Barratos island group were obese and were then

128

Id.
See Levi, supra note 11, at 501–02; Brewer, supra note 3, at 932–33.
130
Heit, supra note 29, at 576–77.
131
Id. at 583–84.
132
Id. at 570 (stating that compiling “a list of the most convincing, or inductionpromoting, cases does not necessarily lead to the strongest possible ensemble of
cases”).
133
Id.
134
Id. (“The interesting result is that sometimes a set of individually weak cases
can make a strong case together.”).
135
This is supported in the legal scholarship as well. Aldisert wrote that “[i]n
generalization by enumeration, we can say that the larger the number of specific
instances, the more certain is the resulting generalization.” ALDISERT, supra note 6,
at 92.
136
Heit, supra note 29, at 577.
129
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presented with varying numbers of sample sizes of these obese
islanders, ranging from one, three, or twenty.137 Subjects’
inferences that all Barratos islanders were more likely to be obese
substantially increased with greater sample size or numerosity.138
Conversely, for more homogenous premises that are not as subject
to variable conditions, such as obesity, a smaller sample size was
sufficient for inductive strength.139
The more diverse the examples, the greater the inductive
strength. Repeating the same or highly similar evidence is not
more convincing than stating compelling evidence once.140
Diversity, or the variability of individual examples, leads to
stronger inductive capacity: the greater the diversity of examples,
the stronger the induction.141 While counterintuitive and more
cognitively demanding, converging and conflicting evidence from
different sources promotes stronger or broader inductive
generalizations.142 This finding that variable examples promote
stronger generalizations is “now considered a truism” in areas of
inductive research, such as categorization.143
The less similarity there is, the stronger the ultimate
induction tends to be, even though this finding seems to contradict
the similarity effect discussed previously. For example, people are
more willing to conclude that “all mammals love onions” if “hippos
and hamsters love onions” than if “hippos and rhinos do” because
of the lack of similarity between hippos and hamsters compared to

137

Id.
Id.
139
Id.
140
This is also consistent with the legal reasoning literature that discusses the
problems with too few examples/instances. ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 51 (“The force
of an induced generalization by enumeration is measured by the quantity of
instances.”). Aldisert also specifically references numerosity in evaluating the
strength of inducted rules. Aldisert explains the potential pitfalls of lacking sufficient
numerosity: “the fallacy of hasty generalization,” “a fallacious reasoning that seeks to
establish a generalization by the enumeration of instances, without obtaining a
representative number of instances,” also known as “jumping to conclusions.” Id. at
50, 92.
141
Heit, supra note 29, at 577.
142
Id. Researchers have found considerable evidence for diversity-based
reasoning. Id. at 577–79.
143
Id. at 577 (citation omitted) (“This result, that more variable observations
promote broader or stronger generalizations, is now considered a truism in areas of
research near to induction, such as categorization.”).
138
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hippos and rhinos.144 This phenomenon has strong empirical
support in multiple domains.145
When inducing from multiple cases, a more numerous and
wider continuum of cases yields a more robust and logically sound
generalization. This is also consistent across disciplines. For
example, legal theory discusses the need for multiple, diverse
examples to avoid the fallacy of the “hasty generalization,” or
jumping to conclusions.146 Logicians and cognitive scientists agree
that insufficient numerosity and non-diverse examples lead to
illogical inferences.147
Simply assembling a list of the most “convincing” or inductionproducing examples does not lead to the strongest ensemble of
cases. A set of individually weak cases can make a strong rule as
a whole, provided that those cases are consistent with numerosity
and diversity principles. This is highly relevant for synthesizing
rules capturing a wide diversity of factual scenarios. These
findings provide specific tools supported by cognitive science
literature on inductive reasoning and categorization that directly
apply to legal synthesis.
The rational force of a synthesized rule is similarly measured
by the quantity of individual instances.148 The more numerous the
sample size, the more certain the resulting generalized
principle.149 Brewer acknowledged John Stuart Mill’s argument
that “the rational force of . . . induction” depends on the “number
of statistically significant items . . . ‘induced,’ ” with additional
constraints such as legal relevance.150
For example, which of the following numerosity scenarios
would promote a stronger inference that your house is likely to be
burglarized—that one house on your street had been burglarized
in the past year or ten houses on your street in the past year?
Furthermore, which diversity effect would result in a stronger
inference that your house would be targeted—that all burglaries

144

Similarity Based Induction—Thinking and Reasoning, MITCH MED.
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 27, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.mitchmedical.us
/thinking-reasoning/similaritybased-induction.html [https://perma.cc/Z8HN-WB6M].
145
As discussed in Part I, Justice Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
explored diversity of category members in reasoning about dangerous products. See
supra Part I; 217 N.Y. 382, 385–89 (1916).
146
Aldisert, Clowney & Peterson, supra note 15, at 14.
147
Id.
148
ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 13.
149
Id. at 92.
150
Brewer, supra note 3, at 932.
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occurred in February, and it is now November? Or that the
burglaries were spread out over months and seemed to be
randomly occurring? Answers to these questions may seem
obvious to most readers, yet law students and some lawyers
struggle to apply similar principles in legal analysis.
3.

Relevant Similarity

Relevant similarity plays a crucial role in induction. Some
properties are more inferable or generalizable than others.151
When we observe an object with various properties, which
properties are more likely to be projected or inferred to another
object than others? This brings the discussion back to the concept
of similarity with a focus on relevant similarity.
Returning to the burglary example, if your neighbor’s home is
burglarized, the perceived risk for your home based on the
relevant similarity of proximity promotes the inference that your
home is at risk, too. The exterior color of your home compared to
the color of your neighbor’s home, however, is a less relevant
similarity than proximity in the burglary scenario. Now, change
the relevant similarity induction category to curb appeal for sale
of homes—exterior home color may be the relevant similarity for
that particular induction category.
Induction is highly dependent on context. People draw
inferences and assess similarity between categories differently
based on the property being projected—that is, relevant
similarity.152 For example, bagels can be part of the “breads”
category or the “breakfast food” category depending on relevant
similarity of types of chemical structure or meal. Judge Cardozo’s
MacPherson opinion demonstrates this relevant similarity
determination as well. Rather than relying on natural similarity
and examining only other Buicks, or cars, or wheeled vehicles,
Cardozo examined the relevant similarity of dangerous products—
poisons, explosives, and other items “reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made.”153

151

Properties have a crucial role in inductive reasoning. Depending on the
context, “a particular property may be projectable, nonprojectable, or somewhere in
between.” Heit, supra note 29, at 581.
152
Brewer, supra note 3, at 950.
153
See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 385–87, 389 (1916).
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Novices Prefer Simple, Unidimensional Categories

Numerosity and diversity lead to greater inductive strength,
but they also increase task complexity, cognitive load, and
difficulty in induction and categorization. More complex concepts
are harder to abstract, categorize, and ultimately learn.
Researchers have found that novices oversimplify categories when
abstracting and categorizing, especially when the information itself
is complex or when categories are ill-defined.154
Novices rely heavily on surface features of category items,
rather than abstracting structural features,155 and prefer the
development of unidimensional categories based on single
features, such as green things, than those based on multiple
features, such as green and square, or green or two-sided.156 For
example, a tendency to create a rule such as “all the things in
Category A are red” would be preferable to “things in Category A
tend to be red, have four legs, and meow.”157
Law students, novices to the study of the law and legal
analysis, struggle when inducing generalized rules from a set of
individual cases satisfying the numerosity and diversity criteria
and demonstrate a similar reliance on surface features of
individual cases and preference for simpler, unidimensional rules.
This is true even when categories are defined, such as in legal
casebooks, and increases exponentially in open research. The
preference for simple, unidimensional categories and surface
features is consistent with law students’ preference for parroting
of judicial text and creation of simplified rules lacking nuance
exemplified by overuse of quotations instead of more complex
paraphrasing and synthesis.
D. Limitations in Synthesis in Legal Analysis
Critics of rhetoric and legal synthesis deride it as cookery158—
the false art of medicine—arguing that induction relies on
154

Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory demonstrates that “classification is graded
rather than all-or-none and that some items in a category are ‘better’ [or more typical
category] members than others.” Gregory L. Murphy et al., Do Americans Have a
Preference for Rule-Based Classification?, 41 COGNITIVE SCI. 2026, 2026 (2017). For
oversimplification in legal reasoning, see generally Sunstein, supra note 36.
155
See generally Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving,
12 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 306 (1980).
156
Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 2047.
157
Id. at 2027–28.
158
Plato criticized rhetoric for manipulating audiences and manipulating truth,
describing rhetoric as akin to cookery, the false art of medicine. Plato, Gorgias, in
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imaginative moments, suggesting it is a flawed art and logically
flawed.159 These criticisms are partly based on the highly
subjective, context-dependent nature of synthesis. Dan Hunter
argues that “the interpretation of any given set of cases will differ
depending on the interpreter.”160 After introduction to the case
method in legal analysis, students realize that the rule of law from
a case or a line of cases could be stated differently, each one
potentially accurate.161
Synthesis reveals the law is malleable. Each individual case
may be capable of producing more than one rule, depending on the
lawyer’s need, especially where a rule is implied rather than
explicitly stated. Lawyers often disagree on the rule extracted
from a single case.162 When synthesizing a rule based on
commonalities in multiple case rules, the categorization of cases
could be subjective or incorrect. The lawyer may have relied on an
insufficient number of cases in generalizing a synthesized rule,
falling into the hasty generalization trap. Even if relying on the
same authorities, synthesized rules may differ.
While
advantageous for persuasive writing and advocacy, this inherent
subjectivity can be confusing for novices learning how to analyze
“objective[ly].”163

COMPLETE WORKS, 462b–466a (John M. Cooper ed., 1997). See also Kristen Konrad
Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: Understanding the Schism
Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
108, 113 (2006); Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis: A
Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 217, 222
(2011) (envisioning a Socratic dialogue between two forms of synthesis of legal
authorities: rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis); Brett G. Scharffs, The
Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 775 (2004) (“[P]ractical
wisdom, craft, and rhetoric are the three elements that compose or characterize legal
reasoning.”).
159
Brewer, supra note 3, at 954.
160
Hunter, supra note 19, at 379. Though all lawyers are deriving generalizations
inductively, the factors lawyers use may differ as “[t]he choice of factors is an entirely
personal one.” Id. Therefore, we cannot therefore “expect identical rules in each
domain since each [lawyer] will induce different rules.” Id.
161
Harry W. Jones, Notes on the Teaching of Legal Method, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13,
23 (1948).
162
M. B. W. Sinclair, The Semantics of Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L.J. 373,
385–86 (1986) (“For any given set of data there are indefinitely many possible
explanations. Two lawyers working on the same precedent set, but for opposing
parties, most often will select two explanatory theories fitting the data but reaching
opposite conclusions . . . .”).
163
See Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing potential differences in
synthesis in objective versus persuasive synthesis).
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Legal scholars note the difficulty in distinguishing reasoning
from dicta in legal opinions and acknowledge that there are
infinite ways that a rule may be formulated to fit an argument.164
Opposing lawyers working on the same dataset of precedent will
persuasively synthesize precedent to advocate for opposing
conclusions.165
Because lawyers are empowered to dispute claims to authority
no matter how formulated, how is one to decide that a rule is
reliable?166 Common responses to judging the reliability of a
synthesized rule depend on the judgment of experience—you’ll
know it when you see it, or it takes experience.167
But “it takes experience” is not just dissatisfying; in occluding
the synthesis process inexperience, it further propagates the lack
of transparency that makes synthesis difficult to teach, learn, and
assess. Some research suggests that development of necessary
expertise requires thousands of hours of practice or working
through 50,000 examples, well beyond the capacity of a three-year
legal education.168
But all is not lost. Fortunately, scientific research indicates
that learners can improve induction and abstract thinking.169
Research provides specific, concrete recommendations for effective
synthesis in the absence of such expertise. The following section
will discuss concrete, evidence-based recommendations to
accelerate abstraction and synthesis in legal analysis to benefit
novices and experts. These concrete applications apply not only to
legal writing pedagogy, but to legal analysis and pedagogy in
general.
164
Michael B. W. Sinclair, What Is the “R” In “IRAC”?, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
457, 469–70 (2003). Sinclair points out that “it is a feature of the common law system
that there is no way of settling the correct text or formulation of the rules, so that it
as a single rule in what Pollock called ‘any authentic form of words.’ ” Id. at 470
(citation omitted). If you are lucky, you will find “suitably rule-like abstraction in the
opinion . . . expressed in a sentence or two.” Id. However, if that rule suits your
argument but not mine, we are under no obligation to agree that it is the law. Id.
165
Sinclair, supra note 162, at 386.
166
Sinclair, supra note 164, at 469–70; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1983); Brewer, supra note 3, at 932 n.19.
167
As discussed previously, some legal writing texts explain the need to “test” the
synthesized rule for realism or reliability. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
168
Dedre Gentner et al., Learning and Transfer: A General Role for Analogical
Encoding, 95 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (2003).
169
Barbara A. Spellman, Reflections of a Recovering Lawyer: How Becoming a
Cognitive Psychologist—and (in Particular) Studying Analogical and Causal
Reasoning—Changed My Views About the Field of Psychology and Law, 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2004).
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III. HOW LEGAL SYNTHESIS REALLY WORKS
Many difficulties in teaching, performing, and evaluating
legal synthesis stem from inducing generalizations from multiple
cases with invisible holdings, disparate facts, and conflicting
information, as well as from limited instruction on how synthesis
works in legal texts.
This Part discusses how synthesis really works and describes
concrete, evidence-based steps of legal synthesis informed by
cognitive science research. First, abstract individual cases to the
“gist” or “abstract” level, rather than the detail level. Second,
compare and abstract similarities and general principles from
multiple cases whenever possible to observe structural
similarities. Third, incorporate numerous and diverse cases to
create a comprehensive, reliable synthesized rule. Each will be
discussed in more detail below.
A.

Abstract Individual Cases Immediately

First, abstract individual cases immediately. The common
strategy is to extract a rule from individual cases, but an approach
better supported by cognitive theory is to abstract single examples
to a gist or abstract level, rather than to extract a detailed rule.170
Abstracting information at a “gist” or “abstract” level rather than
at a “detail” level facilitates transfer, categorization, and later
induction of rules across multiple cases.171
For example, researchers studied the abstraction of structural
features in disparate factual examples.172 Researchers told
subjects about an impenetrable fortress held by a brutal dictator,
and a general who sought to overtake the impenetrable fortress.173
The fortress story is an example of a “convergence problem,”174
where multiple smaller forces converge on a target, but that
information was not shared with the research subjects.175 Subjects
were told that the fortress was in the center of the country with

170

Id. at 1199.
Jean M. Mandler & Felice Orlich, Analogical Transfer: The Roles of Schema
Abstraction and Awareness, 31 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 485, 487 (1993).
172
Gick & Holyoak, supra note 155, at 350 (“Using an analogy involves mapping
the representations of two (or perhaps more) instances onto one another. Similar
processes may also be involved in abstracting the relational structure common to a set
of particular instances.”).
173
See id. at 351–52.
174
Mandler & Orlich, supra note 171, at 485.
175
See Gick & Holyoak, supra note 155, at 319–20.
171
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roads radiating out like spokes on a wheel.176 The general wanted
to overtake the fortress using his military forces, but learned the
dictator had placed mines on the roads.177 The general knew a fullscale attack using large forces would detonate the mines, but
individual soldiers could pass unharmed.178
But sending
individual soldiers down the roads would be insufficient to
overtake the fortress.179 The general divided his large army into
small groups, dispatched simultaneously on the many roads.180
Each small group passed down the many roads, safely over the
mines, and converged on the fortress in full strength, overtaking
the fortress and defeating the dictator.181
Subjects were then told to describe the fortress story at one of
three different levels: detail, gist, and abstract.182 In the detail
condition, subjects were instructed to provide a factually detailed
summary, “including specific characters, places, and actions,” such
as: “The evil dictator lived in the middle of the country. He planted
bombs to allow his troops to come and go, but to deter others,
etc.”183 In the gist condition, subjects were instructed to provide
the underlying idea or structure of the story, “but still in a concrete
form,” and “to summarize briefly the main points . . . by stating
the general’s goal, dilemma, and solution.”184 “The general’s goal
was to overthrow the dictator with his army. His entire army
couldn’t go down one road. So he split his army and had them
arrive at the fortress at the same time, thereby overthrowing the
dictator.”185 In the abstract condition, subjects were instructed to
focus on “abstract structure, or relations among the goal, dilemma,
and solution, rather than specific objects or actions,” to “reflect a
more general solution.”186 “An individual wants to overcome a
central target with a strong force, but this force can’t be applied on
one path. So the force is split into smaller lower intensities which
converge at the target and overcome it.”187

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
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Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mandler & Orlich, supra note 171, at 485–86.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After describing the fortress example at the detail, gist, or
abstract level, subjects were given three distractor reasoning
problems and a radiation problem as the target problem to solve.188
The radiation problem is another convergence problem, again,
unknown to the subjects.189 In the radiation problem, a doctor is
treating a patient with a malignant stomach tumor.190 The tumor
is inoperable, but the patient will die if the tumor is not
destroyed.191 A ray can be used to destroy the tumor, but if used
at high intensity, the tumor and surrounding healthy tissue will
be destroyed.192 At lower intensity, the ray is harmless to
surrounding tissue, but also ineffective at reducing the tumor.193
The subjects were told to devise a solution to the radiation
problem.194
The goal of Holyoak’s study was to examine which description
level—detail, gist, or abstract—would lead subjects to abstract
structural relationships between the fortress and radiation
examples.195 Subjects who described the fortress example at a gist
or abstract level were much more successful at seeing the
structural relationship between the fortress and radiation
problems—both types of convergence problems—than subjects
who described at the detail level.196
Abstraction to the gist and abstract levels allowed subjects to
observe structural features necessary for generating rules beyond
surface features at the detail level. Abstracting individual
examples immediately leads to pattern and relationship
recognition across examples and aids synthesis.
Barbara
Spellman, lawyer and social scientist, recommends changing the
way we initially abstract information or representations of
information.197 For example, the fortress story could be abstracted
as a general overtaking a brutal dictator or as a powerful force
dividing and converging to succeed at a task. The need to abstract
individual examples beyond surface details to reveal structural
188

Id. at 485.
Id.
190
Gick & Holyoak, supra note 155, at 307–08.
191
Id. at 308.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 307–08.
195
Mandler & Orlich, supra note 171, at 485–86.
196
Id. at 486.
197
See Spellman, supra note 169, at 1198–99. Spellman offers a unique
perspective on this research, as a lawyer who then became a social scientist,
reluctantly studying analogy in the context of legal reasoning.
189
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features is supported by scholarship from multiple disciplines on
transfer,198 legal analysis,199 clinical skills,200 as well as cognitive
psychology.201
Effective synthesis begins at the individual case level. For
example, rather than describing the fortress example as a case
about a general or a case about a fortress, abstraction to the gist
or abstract level as a case about how a powerful force that is
divided and converged to conquer a target better promotes
synthesis.202
In legal education, the typical advice for synthesis is to read
individual cases and extract an overarching rule. But most
novices get stuck on surface features and case details. Any
resulting “extracted rule” will likely be subject to the same
limitations. Instead, abstract single cases to a higher level of
abstraction to the gist or abstract level to move beyond surface
details and observe structural features, such as the underlying
dispute, material facts, holding, and rationale.
Focusing solely on the detail level—specific surface factual
details—obstructs abstraction and transfer.
This presents
immediate problems for the case method and Socratic method of
questioning, as well as current case briefing instruction methods,
where the focus is on details of individual cases.203 Abstracting
individual cases to the gist and abstract levels promotes transfer,
increases the perception of structural and relational similarities to
other examples, and aids in induction of relevant similarity.

198
Brian H. Ross, Distinguishing Types of Superficial Similarities: Different
Effects on the Access and Use of Earlier Problems, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 456,
456 (1989).
199
Laurel Currie Oates, I Know That I Taught Them How to Do That, 7 LEGAL
WRITING 1, 1, 3 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (“Most problems can be represented in a
number of different ways: they can be represented in terms of their surface features,
that is, the specific facts of the problem; they can be represented in terms of their
underlying structures, that is, those abstract features or principles that are relevant
to the solution; and they can be represented in terms of the procedures required to
solve problem[s].”).
200
Mary Nicol Bowman & Lisa Brodoff, Cracking Student Silos: Linking Legal
Writing and Clinical Learning Through Transference, 25 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 275
(2019) (footnote omitted) (“Much has been written on teaching for transfer,
particularly in the last forty years, including a number of useful articles applying that
research to legal education.”).
201
Spellman, supra note 169, at 1197.
202
Id.
203
See MERTZ, supra note 5, at 4–5 (discussing the study of first year courses in
multiple law schools of the Socratic method of questioning and heavy reliance on
details from individual cases).
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Abstract Multiple Cases Simultaneously

Second, compare and abstract from two or more cases at once,
instead of relying on individual cases, since comparing two cases
can lead to a better understanding as a whole even when neither
case is well-understood individually.204
Comparing and
abstracting multiple cases simultaneously helps learners
recognize both surface features and non-superficial underlying
features and structural similarities.205
For example, comparing an office to a jail highlights common
structural features—constraining environments—rather than
irrelevant surface details such as the color of the rug or interior
décor.206 Analyzing two examples simultaneously fosters the
extraction of common underlying principles and structural
similarities.207 However, students may not spontaneously abstract
general, underlying principles and may need explicit instruction
or guidance.
In the same study using the fortress example, researchers had
subjects read the fortress story and a story about a firefighter who
used many small streams of water simultaneously from different
directions to extinguish a large fire.208 A separate control group
only learned the fortress story. Researchers then asked subjects
to solve the radiation problem about the inoperable tumor.
Subjects who learned about multiple examples with similar
structural features, such as the fortress problem and firefighter
problem, were twice as likely to see the connection, to recognize
the problems as convergence problems, and to suggest the
convergence solution.209
Further, researchers have studied this comparison technique
with materials highly relevant to law school learning—case-based
learning in a business school negotiation class with MBA
students.210 Subjects who simultaneously analyzed two cases with
similar structural features were up to three times more likely to
use the abstracted principle than subjects who had analyzed one
case at a time.211 These findings were replicated on novices,
204

Spellman, supra note 169, at 1197–98; Gentner et al., supra note 168, at 394.
Gentner et al., supra note 168, at 394.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer,
15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 21–22, 37 (1983).
209
Id. at 22–23.
210
Gentner et al., supra note 168, at 395.
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Id.
205

316

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:285

university undergraduate “students who had little or no formal
negotiation experience or management expertise.”212 Students
who had directly compared two cases were more likely to transfer
principles from the previously studied cases and propose a more
sophisticated solution.213
Reliance on superficial details inhibits synthesis.214 Part of
the difficulty in legal synthesis is promoting recognition beyond
surface details to deeper, structural similarities based on
previously unseen features. Many legal writing scholars recognize
the value of comparing two or more examples to abstract
commonalities.215 This is apparent in the use of case charting to
both organize legal research and to extract general principles and
begin the process of synthesis.
C.

Numerous, Diverse Cases Yield Stronger Synthesis

Incorporating numerous and diverse cases is the key to
comprehensive, reliable synthesis, yet it is also where we go awry.
We should all be like Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Company in evaluating numerous, diverse cases to synthesize a
comprehensive reliable rule. Cardozo could have only looked to
one other case to synthesize, but he did not. More so, the cases he
chose were diverse in surface details and revealed similar
structural relationships and similarities. Cardozo could have
looked only to other cases involving defective vehicles or vehicle
parts. Instead, he synthesized from a diverse, numerous sample
set with deeper reach and different surface features, not just five
cases about defective wooden wheels or defective manufacture of
vehicle parts.216 Providing law students with many examples with
similar structures but diverse surface features is a common
technique used in traditional casebooks.217 While faculty may
understand the utility of diverse cases, students do not.
212

Id.
Id. at 402.
214
Legal scholars have noted a similar tendency in law students to focus on
surface similarities. See Oates, supra note 199, at 4.
215
See, e.g., id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (“Researchers have found that there is a
much higher rate [of] transfer in those fields in which the underlying structures are
taught through context-free examples than there is in the fields in which the
underlying structures are taught in the context of specific fact patterns.”).
216
See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text; Oates, supra note 199, at 7
(“Thus, in teaching legal research, instead of providing our students with one example
of how to research a problem that requires them to locate a statute and the cases
interpreting and applying that statute, we should provide them with a number of
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Synthesis of a broad principle from insufficient cases leads to
the fallacy of the hasty generalization and unreliable synthesized
rules. Legal scholars warn of the dangers in generalizing
principles on the basis of a single case, as it takes numerous,
diverse examples categorized on relevant similarity to result in a
reliable rule—to create a rule “so general, so universal, so capable
of dealing with questions of that type that you can say here is an
authoritative starting point for legal reasoning in all analogous
cases.”218
CONCLUSION
Legal synthesis is poorly understood, hard to perform and
describe, relegated to the hidden curriculum in legal education,
but critical to legal reasoning. We can and should demand more
precision and systematization to produce reliable, logically sound
legal synthesis. To that end, the following recommendations are
essential to effective, comprehensive, and logically reliable legal
synthesis.
Synthesis begins at the individual case level.
First,
immediately abstract individual cases from the detail level to the
gist or abstract level to move past superficial details and observe
structural features. This immediate abstraction allows one to
move past specific case details, which inhibit and obstruct later
synthesis.
Immediately abstracting individual cases when
reading, briefing, discussing, and case charting increases
synthesis.
Second, abstracting multiple cases simultaneously improves
synthesis by revealing structural features and similarities.
Because synthesis is contextual and does not occur in a vacuum,
abstract multiple cases simultaneously to observe structural
similarities and differences. Juxtapose related cases on a similar
legal issue.
Comparing and abstracting multiple cases
simultaneously forces one to move past disparate and conflicting
surface details to structural features to evaluate structural
similarities and differences.
Third, numerosity and diversity of cases within a category
promotes strong, reliable synthesis. When synthesizing a group of
different examples.”). See also Oates, supra note 5, at 709 (footnote omitted) (“Under
the broader definition of transfer, the casebook method fares much better. One of the
casebook method’s strengths is its use of contrasting examples.”).
218
Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 330–
31 (1940).
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cases, include numerous and diverse cases, cases with conflicting
holdings, facts, and reasoning. While more difficult, synthesis
resulting from numerosity and diversity yields stronger, more
reliably sound generalizations and representations of group
members.

